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THE  CATHOLIC  CHURCH  AND  THE  PAYCHECK
PROTECTION  PROGRAM:  ASSESSING




In the middle of March 2020, as the world grappled with arguably the
most serious public health crisis in recent history, economic and social activ-
ity came to a halt.1  Faced with growing unemployment and an impending
recession, the United States government enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (“CARES”) Act, a broad relief bill that included the
Paycheck Protection Program (PPP).2  The PPP was designed to assist with
common costs like payroll and rent; it encouraged private lenders to issue
loans to struggling organizations on favorable terms.3  Coordinated through
the Small Business Administration (SBA), the federal government promised
to guarantee—and ultimately forgive—those private loans if used for an enu-
merated list of expenses.4
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Bachelor of Arts in
Political Science and Business Administration, St. Norbert College, 2019.  I would like to
thank Professor Stephanie Barclay for her valuable feedback, as well as Professor Charles
Jacobs for sparking my interest in this topic.  Thank you to Carter Wietecha, Owen
Toepfer, and the other members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their helpful comments
and detailed edits.  Finally, thank you to my family, friends, and, most especially, my
husband-to-be, Hunter Van Asten, for their love and support.  All mistakes belong solely to
me.
1 See Impact of Opening and Closing Decisions by State, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIV. OF MED.:
CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/data/state-timeline/new-confirmed-
cases/california (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).  For example, on March 11, 2020, California
public health officials imposed a limit of 250 people on public gatherings. Id. By March
15, all bars and nightclubs were ordered closed, and those with health risks were urged to
isolate. Id. And, by March 19, the Governor ordered all individuals to stay at their place of
residence. Id.
2 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat.
281 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9080); 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)
(West 2021).
3 Id. § 636(a)(36)(F).
4 Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142,
§ 3(b)(8), 134 Stat. 641, 642 (2020).
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Despite its longstanding policy to the contrary, the SBA deemed princi-
pally religious organizations eligible for PPP loan consideration.5  Accord-
ingly, Catholic parishes, the focus of this Note, and other houses of worship
applied for and received PPP assistance.6  But, controversy quickly ensued.
Some scholars viewed religious inclusion as merely an extension of an other-
wise secular disaster relief plan that transcended obvious constitutional
inquiry.7  From this perspective, the minimization of the pandemic’s overall
economic impact required broad, all-encompassing employment protec-
tions.8  A contingent of legal academics, however, penned a more fashiona-
ble response.  Heeding concern that PPP funding could be used to directly
maintain houses of worship and pay clergy salaries, these scholars decried the
SBA’s inclusionary policy and contended that such federally backed loans
implicated and ran afoul of the Establishment Clause.9  A piece in the Associ-
ated Press, which garnered national attention, assumed this argument.10
However, this Note argues the inclusion of houses of worship and the
subsequent dispersal of PPP funds to the Catholic Church was explicitly consti-
tutional.  Applying the lens of the Supreme Court’s recently announced non-
discrimination principle, this Note considers the ramifications of the SBA’s
official policy and explores the constitutional justification for the SBA’s ad
hoc PPP policy.  In fact, under the nondiscrimination principle, this Note
concludes that the SBA’s policy shift was not just constitutionally permissible,
but probably constitutionally required.
Litigants have yet to challenge the inclusion of religious organizations in
the PPP, but the “dust” of COVID-19 also has yet to settle.  Instead, litigants
are turning to the (virtual) courtroom to dispute limitations on public gath-
erings and the corresponding First Amendment implications.  That, of
5 SBA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING PARTICIPATION OF FAITH-BASED
ORGANIZATIONS IN THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM (PPP) AND THE ECONOMIC INJURY
DISASTER LOAN PROGRAM (EIDL) 1 (2020), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2020-
06/SBA%20Faith-Based%20FAQ%20Final-508.pdf.
6 Tom Gjelten, Many Houses of Worship Have Sought Government Aid, Surveys Show, NPR
(May 6, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/05/06/
851666065/many-houses-of-worship-have-sought-government-aid-surveys-show.
7 See, e.g., Peter J. Reilly, Paycheck Protection, Churches and the Constitution—It’s Compli-
cated, FORBES (June 9, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/peterjreilly/2020/06/09/
paycheck-protection-churches-and-the-constitutionits-complicated/?sh=74e5eaab1006.
8 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, Notes on the Coronacoma (Wonkish), N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
1, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/01/opinion/notes-on-the-coronacoma-
wonkish.html?searchResultPosition=4.
9 See, e.g., Reese Dunklin & Michael Rezendes, Catholic Church Lobbied for Taxpayer
Funds, Got $1.4B, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 10, 2020) https://apnews.com/article/
dab8261c68c93f24c0bfc1876518b3f6; Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard
Schragger, Opinion, The Quiet Demise of the Separation of Church and State, N.Y. TIMES (June
8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/opinion/us-constitution-church-
state.html; Letter from Afr. Am. Ministers Leadership Council et al. to Jovita Carranza,
Adm’r, U.S. Small Bus. Admin. (Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.au.org/sites/default/files/
2020-04/CARES%20Act%20Loan%20Forgiveness%20SBA%20Letter.pdf.
10 See Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 9.
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course, is the subject of another note.11  This Note, however, raises broader
questions than those merely surrounding COVID-19 and the PPP: though
pandemics are rare, disasters are not.  Assuredly, the government again will
be called upon to respond to some future crisis, be it natural or man-made.
The SBA, as well as other federal agencies, should now act to make perma-
nent the administrative structure of the PPP for future government assistance
programs.  As Bishop Lawrence Persico of Erie, Pennsylvania noted: while
“some people may react with surprise that government funding help[s] sup-
port faith-based schools, parishes[,] and dioceses, . . . [t]he separation of
church and state does not mean that those motivated by their faith have no
place in the public square.”12
The analysis of this Note proceeds in four parts.  Part I provides a back-
ground of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as an overview of the PPP.  Part II
examines the evolution of the Religion Clauses’ jurisprudence in the context
of religious organizations’ receipt of government benefits, including the
Court’s modern doctrine: nondiscrimination.  Part III highlights other
instances in which the Catholic Church and other religious organizations
have been eligible for government assistance in periods of disaster.  Finally,
Part IV evaluates the constitutionality of the PPP under the First Amendment
when applied to religious organizations and, more specifically, the Catholic
Church.  This Part also contemplates the permissibility of the PPP under the
Equal Protection Clause, since this Clause is the most frequent basis for litiga-
tion involving discrimination.
I. BACKGROUND
On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization announced that it
had categorized COVID-19 as a pandemic,13 meaning the virus had crossed
international boundaries and was “affecting a large number of people.”14
Within a matter of days, public and private institutions closed their doors,
Americans retreated to their homes, and economic activity collapsed.15
Despite national and local leaders’ promises of quick containment and recov-
ery, by the end of the year, the virus was anything but contained; the United
11 For recent discussion on the topic, however, see generally Calvary Chapel Dayton
Valley v. Sisolak, 140 S. Ct. 2603, 2603–04 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of appli-
cation for injunctive relief); Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63
(2020) (per curiam); S. Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom, 140 S. Ct. 1613, 1613
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring in denial of application for injunctive relief); Caroline
Mala Corbin, Religious Liberty in a Pandemic, 70 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1 (2020).
12 Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 9.
13 Virtual Press Conference on COVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://
www.who.int/docs/default-source/coronaviruse/transcripts/who-audio-emergencies-
coronavirus-press-conference-full-and-final-11mar2020.pdf?sfvrsn=cb432bb3_2.
14 Heath Kelly, The Classical Definition of a Pandemic Is Not Elusive, 89 BULL. WORLD
HEALTH ORG. 540, 540 (2011), https://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/89/7/11-
088815.pdf (quoting A DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY (John M. Last ed., 4th ed. 2001)).
15 See supra note 1.
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States had surpassed nineteen million confirmed cases and 300,000 deaths.16
Among the many tactics employed to “[s]low the [s]pread” of the virus,17
experts especially urged limitations on large public gatherings deemed
“superspreading events.”18  In the religious context, these events earned a
particularly infamous reputation after, for example, an infected pastor and
his wife spread the virus to at least thirty church members, resulting in at
least three deaths.19  Thus, while restrictions fluctuated between capacity lim-
itations and complete closures, churches, synagogues, mosques, and the like
were, for the foreseeable future, unable to proceed with business—or wor-
ship—as usual.20
The Catholic Church—the focus of this Note—responded accordingly.
The vast majority of parishes or, colloquially, churches, indefinitely sus-
pended public Masses to comply with state and local government orders.21
Though many transitioned to online services,22 parishes lost a substantial
source of revenue in the form of weekly collections.23  Bishops, who supervise
parishes within a defined ecclesiastical district (diocese), consequently
reported concerns about paying the salaries and wages of parish staff, and the
16 COVID-19 United States Cases by County, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY OF MED.:
CORONAVIRUS RES. CTR., https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/us-map (last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
17 See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, SLOW THE SPREAD OF COVID-19
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/Young_Mitigation_rec
ommendations_and_resources_toolkit_03_COL.pdf.
18 Christie Aschwanden, How ‘Superspreading’ Events Drive Most COVID-19 Spread, SCI.
AM. (June 23, 2020), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-superspreading-
events-drive-most-covid-19-spread1/.
19 Id.
20 See, e.g., Rachel Treisman, West: Coronavirus-Related Restrictions by State, NPR (Dec. 4,
2020), npr.org/2020/05/01/847416108/west-coronavirus-related-restrictions-by-state.  In
May, for example, places of worship in California were allowed to reopen with modifica-
tions; by July, closures were again ordered in thirty counties. Id.
21 Claire Gecewicz, Few Americans Say Their House of Worship Is Open, But a Quarter Say




23 See JONATHON L. WIGGINS, ALOYSIA SEBUENG MAKOAE & THOMAS P. GAUNT, CTR. FOR
APPLIED RSCH. IN THE APOSTOLATE, MINISTRY IN THE MIDST OF PANDEMIC 2, 13 (2020) (dis-
cussing a survey of bishops in the Spring of 2020, which revealed that the “most common
area of concern is the missed weekend collections that the parishes have been unable to
have due to not celebrating Masses publicly (or online only)”); see also MARK M. GRAY,
THOMAS P. GAUNT, SJ & CAROLYNE SAUNDERS, CTR. FOR APPLIED RSCH. IN THE APOSTOLATE,
U.S. CATHOLIC ONLINE GIVING 21 (2013) (noting that, of recent reported parish donations,
only thirty percent occurred online; sixty-seven percent occurred offline); Francis X.
Rocca, Pandemic Deepens Catholic Church’s Financial Crunch, From Vatican to Parishes, WALL ST.
J. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/pandemic-deepens-catholic-churchs-
financial-crunch-from-vatican-to-parishes-11587736691 (noting that while “90% of the
17,000 Catholic parishes in the U.S. have some method of accepting online giving . . . 50%
of parishes receive less than 10% of their annual donations online.”).
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financial impact was felt on a diocesan level as well.24  With COVID-19 affect-
ing family incomes, bishops also worried that low future enrollments at Cath-
olic schools would gradually reduce the schools’ financial solvency.25  The
financial future for the Catholic Church was uncertain, but deteriorating.
Meanwhile, on March 27, 2020, President Trump signed into law the
CARES Act.26  Encompassing numerous financial relief measures, the CARES
Act contained the PPP,27 a loan administered through the SBA “designed to
provide a direct incentive for small businesses to keep their workers on the
payroll.”28  But, while administered through the SBA, the PPP actually
entailed the issuance of loans from private lenders.29  Any small business or
nonprofit organization with fewer than five hundred employees was
eligible.30
Through the PPP, small businesses were eligible for a loan amount
derived from a multiplier of average monthly payroll costs, and the use of the
funding was limited to select costs including payroll, health care benefits,
salaries, mortgage interest, rent, and utilities.31  These “loans” also were eligi-
ble for full forgiveness, so long as businesses used at least sixty percent of
loan proceeds for payroll costs.32  Such loans were thus, in practice, grants.33
With such favorable terms, the PPP was open to a broad range of businesses,
for a broad range of reasons.  In fact, Senator Marco Rubio, one of the pri-
mary drafters of the CARES Act, noted that the PPP had been designed to
“cover as many people as possible”; loans were not limited to typical “mom
and pop”-type businesses.34
Despite the broad coverage of the PPP, the eligibility of religious institu-
tions was not immediately clear.  Traditionally, SBA regulation dictates that
businesses “principally engaged in teaching, instructing, counseling or indoc-
trinating religion or religious beliefs”—churches—are ineligible for SBA bus-
24 See WIGGINS ET AL., supra note 23, at 13–14.
25 Id.
26 Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat.
281 (2020) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9080).
27 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36) (West 2021).
28 Paycheck Protection Program, SBA, https://www.sba.gov/funding-programs/loans/
coronavirus-relief-options/paycheck-protection-program (last visited Mar. 11, 2021) (web-
site no longer using this language).
29 Thomas W. Joo & Alex Wheeler, The “Small Business” Myth of the Paycheck Protection
Program, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 21, 28 (2020).
30 15 U.S.C.A. § 636(a)(36)(D)(i).
31 Id. § 636(a)(36)(E), (F)(i).
32 See Paycheck Protection Program Flexibility Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-142,
§ 3(b)(8), 134 Stat. 641, 642 (2020).
33 See, e.g., In re Roman Cath. Church of the Archdiocese of Sante Fe, 615 B.R. 644,
657 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2020) (“[T]he PPP is not a loan program.  It is a grant or support
program.” (footnote omitted)).
34 Joo & Wheeler, supra note 29, at 32–33 (2020) (discussing the misconceptions that
the PPP was designed only for small businesses, and large corporations exploited loopholes
in order to receive funds).
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iness loans.35  In 1996, when this regulation was enacted, the SBA defended
religious ineligibility on the basis of Establishment Clause concerns.36  The
narrative shifted for the PPP, however.  Shortly after the passage of the
CARES Act, the SBA posited that religious ineligibility (rather than eligibil-
ity) violated the Constitution and announced that faith-based organizations
were eligible to receive loans.37
Importantly, the SBA did not accompany its decision with a new regula-
tion.  The SBA instead “hid the elephant in the mousehole” and inconspicu-
ously noted its PPP policy in an FAQ publication.38  This is not to imply that
the SBA was hasty or deceitful; the SBA’s brevity was likely a reaction to exter-
nal pressures for expediency as entities began loan applications.  Yet, the
SBA’s PPP policy promulgation remains problematically informal and tempo-
rary—the 1996 regulation is still the law for all instances but the PPP.39
The SBA also made clear that the Catholic Church, like most faith-based
organizations, was exempt from the “affiliation rule.”40  This rule generally
groups affiliates, or those entities that share some aspect of control (like
franchises), when ascertaining the number of employees within an organiza-
tion.41  Absent exemption, application of the affiliation rule to the hierarchal
structure of the Catholic Church likely would group all dioceses within the
United States as a single entity.42  The ramifications are substantial.  As of
2010, the average parish had an estimated staff count of only 9.5 members;
slightly more than half occupied ministerial positions.43  But, when com-
35 13 C.F.R. § 120.110(k) (2019).
36 VALERIE C. BRANNON, CONG. RSCH SERV., LSB10445, ELIGIBILITY OF RELIGIOUS ORGA-
NIZATIONS FOR THE CARES ACT’S PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM 1 (2020).
37 SBA, supra note 5, at 1 (declining to enforce the applicable regulations that “imper-
missibly exclude some religious entities” because they “bar the participation of a class of
potential recipients based solely on their religious status” and promising to amend those
regulations to conform with the Constitution).
38 See id.
39 Notably, per its promise in the FAQ publication, the SBA proposed a regulation in
December 2020 to make religious entities permanently eligible for loan consideration.  Reg-
ulatory Reform Initiative: Streamlining and Modernizing the 7(a), Microloan, and 504
Loan Programs to Reduce Unnecessary Regulatory Burden, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,676, 80,677–78
(proposed Dec. 14, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pts. 120, 123).
40 See, e.g., 13 e-C.F.R. § 121.103(b)(10)(i) (2021) (“The relationship of a faith-based
organization to another organization is not considered an affiliation with the other organi-
zation . . . [if] the relationship is based on a religious teaching or belief. . . .”); Business
Loan Program Temporary Changes; Paycheck Protection Program, 85 Fed. Reg. 20,817,
20,819 (Apr. 15, 2020) (to be codified at 13 C.F.R. pt. 121); SBA, supra note 5, at 4 (noting
that the SBA will not assess a faith-based organization’s assertion of a religious exemption
from the affiliation rules).
41 13 C.F.R. § 121.103(a) (2020).
42 See 1983 CODE c.331 (noting the Catholic Pope possesses “supreme, full, immediate,
and universal ordinary power in the Church”); 1983 CODE c.368 (explaining that dioceses
constitute “[p]articular churches” within the Catholic Church); 1983 CODE c.374, § 1
(“Every diocese or other particular church is to be divided into distinct parts or parishes.”).
43 MARK M. GRAY, MARY L. GAUTIER & MELISSA A. CIDADE, THE CHANGING FACE OF U.S.
CATHOLIC PARISHES 1, 3, 60 (2011).
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bined with all other parishes, the employee count of the Catholic Church in
the United States totaled over 160,000 individuals.44  Include employees of
Catholic hospitals, schools, nursing homes, and other charitable institutions,
and the number likely exceeded one million, well over the SBA’s five hun-
dred employee limit.45  Thus, these dual exceptions—both specific to the
PPP and long-standing—incentivized financially burdened dioceses to seek
monetary assistance through the PPP.
Nearly all Catholic dioceses took advantage of the opportunity.  In a sur-
vey of Catholic bishops, ninety-five percent reported they helped their par-
ishes apply to federal or state assistance programs, like the PPP.46  While
federal data is limited, The Associated Press reported a generous response from
the SBA: the Catholic Church likely received at least 3500 loans and $1.4
billion in aid, which allowed the Church and its organizations to retain over
400,000 jobs.47  This article, however, suggested a sort of malfeasance on the
part of Catholic institutions that received funding, specifically noting the
Church’s large outstanding financial liabilities from ongoing clergy sexual
abuse settlements.48
Legal experts quoted by the Associated Press also argued that a govern-
mental “special dispensation” and “structural favoritism,” coupled with the
Catholic Church’s lobbying efforts, led the Church to receive legislative
exceptions and billions of dollars of taxpayer funding to which it was not
otherwise entitled.49  Such considerations, the experts urged, had “further
eroded the wall between church and state provided in the First Amend-
ment.”50  While gaining the most attention, The Associated Press article was
merely a piece of a broader academic resistance rooted in the Religion
Clauses.  For example, a month earlier, Professors Tebbe, Schwartzman, and
Schragger authored an opinion piece in the New York Times in which they
referred to the PPP as a crucial moment in the “quiet demise of the already
ailing separation of church and state.”51  Thus, the disdain for the SBA’s PPP
policy was acute and far-reaching.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT’S RELIGION CLAUSES AND
GOVERNMENT AID
A. The Theory of Separatism
As described, the media backlash and cultural outcry that followed the
Church’s PPP aid explicitly relied on the once-controlling jurisprudential
44 Id.
45 Thomas J. Healey, A Blueprint for Change, AMERICA (Sept. 26, 2005); see supra note 30
and accompanying text.
46 WIGGINS ET AL., supra note 23, at 17.
47 Dunklin & Rezendes, supra note 9.
48 Id.
49 Id. (quoting Micah Schwartzman).
50 Id.
51 Tebbe et al., supra note 9.
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norm of church and state separation.  Much of this rhetoric stems from
Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, where he wrote that the
American people had enacted the Religion Clauses, “thus building a wall of
separation between Church [and] State.”52  Historians, however, continue to
debate the meaning of Jefferson’s phrase in context.53  And, as the Supreme
Court has wrestled with this topic over the past several decades, it has contin-
ually evolved its doctrine away from such a separatist stance.  Accordingly, the
concept of a “wall” separating the church and state is no longer the proper
lens of analysis for questions such as these.
The Court’s doctrinal evolution occurred over several distinct phases,
each of which is represented by the adoption of a new jurisprudence.  At the
crux of this ongoing debate is an unclear relationship between the two relig-
ion clauses in the First Amendment: the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause.  On the one hand, the Establishment Clause requires that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”;54 on
the other hand, the Free Exercise Clause requires that “Congress shall make
no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”55  These two clauses, while
expressing complementary values, “often exert conflicting pressures.”56  To
resolve the apparent conflict between these directives, but with a special
focus on establishment, the Court developed a principle of separatism in
Everson v. Board of Education.57  For the majority, Justice Black wrote:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.  Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion
over another. . . .  [T]he clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”58
52 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptists (Jan. 1, 1802), in James Hut-
son, ‘A Wall of Separation’: FBI Helps Restore Jefferson’s Obliterated Draft, 57 LIBR. CONG. INFO.
BULL. 136, 139 (1998).
53 See, e.g., Daniel L. Dreisbach, Origins and Dangers of the “Wall of Separation” Between
Church and State, IMPRIMIS, Oct. 2006, at 1, 2 (“[T]his wall had less to do with the separation
between religion and all civil government than with the separation between the national
and state governments on matters pertaining to religion . . . .”).  Jefferson reportedly
believed the First Amendment imposed restrictions on the national government only. Id.
at 2–3.
54 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
55 Id.
56 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005).
57 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
58 Id. at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).  Notably,
some theorize the Founders actually designed this pair of constitutional freedoms to
encourage multiple religious sects within the Christian Church and prevent the establish-
ment of a national religion, rather than to erect such a wall of separation. See Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99–100 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Robert C. Casad, The Estab-
lishment Clause and the Ecumenical Movement, 62 MICH. L. REV. 419, 420–21 (1964).  For a
discussion of this and other suggested interpretations of the Establishment Clause, see gen-
erally Stephanie H. Barclay, Brady Earley & Annika Boone, Original Meaning and the Estab-
lishment Clause: A Corpus Linguistics Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505 (2019).
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At the same time, the Court tried to balance these striking proscriptions
against free exercise, noting that states cannot exclude religious individuals
from “receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation” because of their
faith or lack thereof.59  Yet, because the Court had been presented with a
question of what a state could do (without invoking concerns of religious
favor), the focus remained on the Establishment Clause; questions of what a
state must do (to protect individuals’ rights) seemed more apt for analysis
under a Free Exercise lens, as discussed in Section I.B, below.60  Thus, apply-
ing these standards, the Court permitted New Jersey’s use of taxpayer funds
for the bus fares of students attending religious schools, since the State also
covered public school students’ fares.61
Though free exercise concerns ultimately persuaded the Court in Ever-
son, the Court clung to separatism in future cases; it was especially prevalent
in cases like Lemon v. Kurtzman, where the Court constructed a three-pronged
paradigm designed to assess the religious motivations and benefits within
government programs.62  Arguably, separatism gained such traction in legal
jurisprudence because of perceived hinderances caused by religion in the
desired advancement of a secular society.  At the time of its adoption, relig-
ious-based censorship of literature, movies, and contraception were garner-
ing disfavor, as were religious exemptions from vaccinations, military service,
and other civic obligations.63  Yet, religious and secular communities jointly
favored separatism, though on differing bases: for the former, as a safeguard
of religious autonomy, and for the latter, as a restriction on religious
funding.64
Following the Court’s hint in Everson, however, even strict applications
of separatism did not warrant a complete denial of government benefits to
religious organizations.  While the Court invalidated programs, or features
thereof, that directly or indirectly benefited religion, it allowed such aid to be
used for secular purposes.65  Justice Powell described the Court’s approach
59 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16.
60 See Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 230,
255–56 (1994).
61 Everson, 330 U.S. at 17.  The Court deemed such bus fare payments to be a “general
government service[ ].” Id. at 17–18.
62 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (establishing three requisite criteria for upholding gov-
ernmental aid for a religious organization: a “secular legislative purpose,” a “principal or
primary effect” that neither “advances nor inhibits religion,” and a lack of “excessive gov-
ernment entanglement with religion” (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970))).
63 See Steven K. Green, The “Irrelevance” of Church-State Separation in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury, 69 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 48–49 (2019); see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 655 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The subjection of dissidents to the
general requirement of saluting the flag, as a measure conducive to the training of chil-
dren in good citizenship, is very far from being the first instance of exacting obedience to
general laws that have offended deep religious scruples.”).
64 See Green, supra note 63, at 50.
65 For a discussion of the Court’s application of separatism in the context of govern-
ment grants for the construction or improvement of religious real property, see Ira C.
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as such: “[S]ome forms of aid may be channeled to the secular [educational
functions at sectarian schools] without providing direct aid to the sectarian.
But the channel is a narrow one . . . .”66
Tilton v. Richardson exemplifies the Court’s doctrine during this era.67
There, the Court assessed the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which
authorized construction grants to church-related colleges for secular build-
ings and facilities.68  The Court upheld the Act, finding the facilities were
devoted “to the secular and not the religious function of the recipient institu-
tions,” and the grants could not be used for “religious instruction, training,
or worship.”69  The Act also contained a provision that mandated repayment
if such religious prohibitions were violated, but only within twenty years after
completion of construction; the Court found this time period insufficient
and severed it from the statute, so the time period for repayment would
remain indefinite.70
If strict separatism was the modern touchstone for the Court’s jurispru-
dence regarding church and state relations, the visceral reaction to the
Church’s receipt of PPP loans—the fear that the wall between church and
state was eroding—may have been justified.71  It is not clear, however, that
the Burger Court saw the “channel” of permissible sectarian aid quite as nar-
rowly as Justice Powell insinuated.72  More importantly, the Court eventually
grew to disfavor separatism; the Rehnquist Court strayed from the paradigm
in favor of a neutrality approach after then-Associate Justice Rehnquist called
for separatism’s abandonment.73  Accordingly, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,
the Court upheld an Ohio-sponsored tuition program that included both
religious and nonreligious schools.74  The Court found the program was
“neutral in all respects toward religion,” especially since the tuition aid was
distributed to parents who, in turn, independently chose the schools to
Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Historic Preservation Grants to Houses of Worship: A Case Study in the
Survival of Separationism, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1142–46 (2002).
66 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 775 (1973).
67 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (plurality opinion).
68 Id. at 674–76.
69 Id. at 679–80, 689.
70 Id. at 682–84.
71 See supra notes 50–51 and accompanying text.
72 For additional examples of the Court finding itself in the “narrow channel” of per-
missible secular aid, see Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669, 680 (1970), which found
that there is “room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality” and held
that church property tax exemptions did not violate the Religion Clauses, and Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 736, 741–49 (1973), which applied the Lemon test and upheld a
South Carolina Act that authorized the issuance of bonds to assist institutions of higher
education, both secular and non-secular, with non-religious construction projects.
73 See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 107 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The
‘wall of separation between church and State’ is a metaphor based on bad history . . . .  It
should be frankly and explicitly abandoned.”); Green, supra note 63, at 53–54.
74 536 U.S. 639, 643–45 (2002).
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which they would send their children.75  Then, in 2017 and again in 2020,
the Court officially responded to Chief Justice Rehnquist’s call in a pair of
cases that not only repudiated separatism, but also embraced a new standard
for government benefit programs: nondiscrimination.
B. The Move Toward Nondiscrimination
As discussed in Section II.A, the doctrine of separatism largely emerged
in cases involving the Establishment Clause and, more specifically, where the
government had opted for a policy of inclusion, allowing religious organiza-
tions equal access to government benefit programs.76  These cases domi-
nated the Burger Court era, as eager plaintiffs—armed with favorable
precedent—sought to halt religion-favoring programs.77  But, with the Rehn-
quist Court’s change in momentum, there came an explosion of litigation
focused instead on the Free Exercise Clause.78  Accordingly, the Court began
to see the Religion Clauses work in tandem: the petitioner promoted the
Free Exercise Clause, and the defendant used the Establishment Clause in
rebuttal, or vice versa.
In Locke v. Davey, for example, the State of Washington had established a
postsecondary scholarship program for high-achieving students.79  The
respondent, Davey, sought to pursue a theology degree and was denied a
scholarship; he brought an action alleging that the denial violated, among
other constitutional provisions, the Free Exercise Clause.80  The Court, how-
ever, relied on the State’s antiestablishment concerns and found the State’s
denial did not offend the Constitution.81  In doing so, the Court confronted
the interaction between the Religion Clauses: “[W]e have long said that
75 Id. at 652–53.  For additional discussion of the Rehnquist Court’s neutrality
approach, see Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993) (“When
the government offers a neutral service on the premises of a sectarian school as part of a
general program that ‘is in no way skewed towards religion,’ . . . that service does not
offend the Establishment Clause.” (quoting Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind,
474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986))). See also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234–35 (1997) (find-
ing as valid a federally funded program providing supplemental education to struggling
students, even when given on the premises of sectarian schools by government employees);
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995) (“[T]he guaran-
tee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral crite-
ria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and
viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse.”); Richard W. Garnett & Jack-
son C. Blais, Religious Freedom and Recycled Tires: The Meaning and Implications of Trinity
Lutheran, 2016 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 105, 106–07 (2017).
76 But see Green, supra note 63, at 32–33 (describing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145 (1878), where the Court endorsed separatism in a free exercise case, though with a
polygamous, theocratic backdrop that essentially lacked church-state separation).
77 See Lupu, supra note 60, at 243–44.
78 See id. at 250; Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Religious Antiliberalism and
the First Amendment, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1341, 1381–83 (2020).
79 540 U.S. 712, 715 (2004).
80 Id. at 717–18.
81 Id. at 725.
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‘there is room for play in the joints’ between [the Clauses].  In other words,
there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not
required by the Free Exercise Clause.”82
The Court’s two most recent cases on this topic have also highlighted
this relationship between the Clauses—a relationship described by some as
one of tension,83 but by others as one of cooperation.84  At the same time,
the Court again shifted its doctrinal approach to government aid in favor of a
broad nondiscrimination principle.85
In Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, the Court assessed a
Missouri scrap tire grant program, whereby schools and daycare centers
could apply for grants to purchase rubber playground material made from
recycled tires.86  Trinity Lutheran Church, which operated a preschool and
daycare center, applied for such a grant but was denied because the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources had a policy excluding churches from con-
sideration.87  The State argued that its own constitution, which included a
more expansive version of the federal Establishment Clause, compelled this
exclusionary policy.88  Instead, the Court found the exclusion—or discrimi-
nation—unconstitutional: “The Department’s policy expressly discriminates
against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public ben-
efit solely because of their religious character. . . .  [S]uch a policy imposes a
penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scru-
tiny.”89  The majority applied the Free Exercise Clause as a protection, in this
context, against a forced surrender of one’s religious status in order to
82 Id. at 718–19 (citation omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669
(1970)).
83 See id. at 718; Anthony Joseph, Down But Not Out: Trinity Lutheran’s Implications for
State No-Aid Provisions, 21 J. CONST. L. ONLINE 1, 2 (2018); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 555, 569–70 (1991) (“The tension arises at the boundary between religion and nonre-
ligion; the Free Exercise Clause suggests the privileging of religion over nonreligion,
whereas the Establishment Clause suggests the normative equality of the two.”).
84 See Carl H. Esbeck, Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confu-
sion, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 883, 887 (2001) (“Given that the Establishment Clause
restrains government and government alone, not private individuals, this ‘clash-of-the-
Clauses’ argument is completely nonsensical.”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Priority of God:
A Theory of Religious Liberty, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 1159, 1219 (2013) (describing the Establish-
ment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause as “two sides of the same coin,” together forbid-
ding government proscription and prescription of religious exercise).
85 See Edward Correia, Trinity Lutheran Church v. Comer: An Unfortunate New Anti-
Discrimination Principle, 18 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 280, 280 (2017).
86 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2017 (2017).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 2021 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508
U.S. 520, 546 (1993)).
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receive public benefits.90  “Discrimination” was the Court’s term of choice; it
characterized Missouri’s exclusion as an “express discrimination against relig-
ious exercise,” and a “discriminatory policy.”91  And, it highlighted prior
cases, such as McDaniel v. Paty and Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City
of Hialeah, where the Court had struck down a discriminatory state statute
and local ordinance, respectively.92
The Court, however, was still stuck with the precedent from Locke, a case
with facts that seemed almost squarely on point.  Accordingly, the Court pre-
served its decisions in both Locke and Trinity Lutheran with a distinction
between use and status: “Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who
he was; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do.”93
Trinity Lutheran Church, meanwhile, was denied a grant simply because of
its status as a church.94  Justice Gorsuch disputed the necessity of this distinc-
tion in his concurring opinion, offering instead that the Court was merely
righting a previous wrong.95  Or, as he and others have pointed out, perhaps
the correct distinction rests on the specific use of government funds in
Locke—training of clergy—with a long history of condemnation under the
First Amendment.96
Altogether, these signals establish a new principle: nondiscrimination.
While not announced explicitly, the Court seemed to suggest that “once the
government offers a benefit that is permitted by the Establishment Clause,
the Free Exercise Clause requires that it be offered to religious and non-
religious entities in the same way.”97  Nonetheless, the Court attempted to
constrain its holding to the specific facts of the case in footnote three, which
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch, members of the majority, refused to join:
“This case involves express discrimination based on religious identity with
respect to playground resurfacing.  We do not address religious uses of fund-
ing or other forms of discrimination.”98  But legal scholars called the Court’s
90 Id. at 2022.  “[T]he Department’s policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It may
participate in an otherwise available benefit program or remain a religious institution.” Id.
at 2021–22.
91 Id. at 2022, 2024; see also Correia, supra note 85, at 288.
92 See Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2020–21; see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 526,
534, 547 (finding local animal cruelty ordinances contrary to the Free Exercise Clause,
since suppression of Santeria worship services, which involve animal sacrifice, was the
“object of the ordinances”); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 622, 629 (1978) (finding a
Tennessee law that disqualified clergy from legislative office to be in violation of the First
Amendment).
93 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2023.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“But can it really matter whether the
restriction in Locke was phrased in terms of use instead of status . . . ?”).
96 See id. (“If that case can be correct and distinguished, it seems it might be only
because of the opinion’s claim of a long tradition against the use of public funds for train-
ing of the clergy, a tradition the Court correctly explains has no analogue here.”); see also
Garnett & Blais, supra note 75, at 129.
97 Correia, supra note 85, at 290.
98 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2024 n.3, 2026 (emphasis added).
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bluff, arguing that the footnote lacked much significance.99  In a concurring
opinion, Justice Gorsuch criticized the inclusion of the footnote; while recog-
nizing its soundness, he anticipated a restrictive perception of what the Court
had designed to be a generally applicable nondiscrimination principle.100
Notwithstanding footnote three, and despite Justice Gorsuch’s concerns,
the Court followed its own lead and extended the nondiscrimination princi-
ple in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue.101  The State of Montana
had enacted a program to provide tuition assistance, in the form of tax cred-
its, to parents of children who attended private schools.102  In order to be
eligible, the taxpayer had to donate to a scholarship organization, which used
donated funds to award tuition scholarships to families facing hardship.103
Nearly all private schools, including those religiously affiliated, qualified for
the program.104  However, in accordance with a no-aid provision of the Mon-
tana Constitution, an administrative rule prohibited the scholarships’ use at
religious schools.105  Petitioners, three mothers, all had children attending a
Christian school, and one child had already received a tuition scholarship.106
The Court relied explicitly on Trinity Lutheran. Responding to Trinity
Lutheran’s use and status distinction, the State argued Locke ought to reign
over its decision to exclude religious schools.107  The Court disagreed: “This
case also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use.”108  Like in
Trinity Lutheran, the State provision barred religious schools from generally
available public benefits solely because of their religious character.109  In
99 Correia, supra note 85, at 291 (“[I]t is hard to see how the opinion can be limited in
the way the footnote suggests in light of the sweeping statements in the opinion.”); Garnett
& Blais, supra note 75, at 124 (“Footnote [three] is not part of the Court’s opinion.”  The
majority opinion “does indeed speak in terms of general, and generally applicable, nondis-
crimination principles.”); Joseph, supra note 83, at 16 (“[F]ootnote three is unlikely to
have [the] practical effect [of limiting the reach of the decision].”); Richard S. Myers, The
Significance of Trinity Lutheran, 17 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 14 (2019) (“The logic of [Chief
Justice Roberts’s] opinion, though, seems to support a much broader principle of
nondiscrimination . . . .”).
100 Trinity Lutheran Church, 137 S. Ct. at 2026 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part) (“I worry
that some might mistakenly read [the footnote] to suggest that only ‘playground resurfac-
ing’ cases, or only those with some association with children’s safety or health, or perhaps
some other social good we find sufficiently worthy, are governed by . . . the Court’s
opinion.”).
101 140 S. Ct. 2246 (2020).
102 Id. at 2251.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2252.
106 Id.
107 See id. at 2257.  The State argued the “provision applies not because of the religious
character of the recipients, but because of how the funds would be used—for ‘religious
education.’” Id. at 2255 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 38, Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2246
(No. 18-1195)).
108 Id. at 2256.
109 Id. at 2255.
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doing so, the Court expanded the meaning of “status” within the paradigm.
The State also had tried to differentiate Trinity Lutheran with a concession
that funds for rubber playground resurfacing could only be characterized as
nonreligious, whereas general school aid, in the form of scholarships, “could
be used for religious ends.”110  Again the Court disagreed; instead of relying
on the State’s characterization of the ultimate end of government funding,
the Court looked only at the State’s criteria for exclusion: the school’s sta-
tus.111  Such status-based discrimination, the Court wrote, encompasses all
exclusions based on status “even if one of its goals or effects” is restricting the
direction of government funds toward religious uses.112  Accordingly, the
Court held the Montana program violated the Free Exercise Clause: “[O]nce
a State decides to [subsidize private education], it cannot disqualify some
private schools solely because they are religious.”113
While Espinoza further clarified the meaning of status within the Court’s
nondiscrimination paradigm, the Court generally left “use” issues
untouched, but with a few hints that, for some hopeful members of the
Court, Locke may be precedent soon forgotten.  Importantly, the Court did
not overrule Locke, yet the Court suggested that cases involving “use” may not
warrant a totally different analysis.114  Justice Gorsuch’s Trinity Lutheran con-
currence also received a nod of approval, with the Court acknowledging that
some of its members question whether a use and status distinction is mean-
ingful.115  Still, the Court gave no real answers: “We acknowledge the point
but need not examine it here.”116
Due to its recency, the implications of Espinoza remain unclear.  Follow-
ing the decision, the Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari in a Sev-
enth Circuit case, St. Augustine School v. Evers, involving the provision of
transportation to religious schools.117  The Circuit Court had held as valid a
Wisconsin statute that limited the State’s obligation to bus private-school stu-
dents to only one school “affiliated with the same religious denomination”
110 Id. at 2256.
111 See id. (noting that the State’s basis for applying the provision hinged “solely on
religious status”).
112 Id.
113 Id. at 2261.
114 Id. at 2257 (“None of this is meant to suggest that . . . some lesser degree of scrutiny
applies to discrimination against religious uses of government aid.”). But see Stephanie H.
Barclay, Untangling Entanglement, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1701, 1714 (2020) (“The Court left
open some possibility that government might restrict funds that were being put to a relig-
ious ‘use.’”).
115 See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257; supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text; see also
Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2275–76 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“[A]ny jurisprudence grounded
on a status-use distinction seems destined to yield more questions than answers. . . .  Most
importantly, though, it is not as if the First Amendment cares.”).
116 Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2257.
117 See St. Augustine Sch. v. Evers, 906 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2018), vacated sub nom. St.
Augustine Sch. v. Taylor, 141 S. Ct. 186 (mem.) (U.S. July 2, 2020) (No. 18-1151).
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within a designated region.118  Thus, while two Catholic schools were located
in the same vicinity, the State only provided bussing to one.119  Upon grant-
ing the certiorari petition, the Court immediately vacated the Seventh Circuit
decision and remanded for consideration in light of Espinoza.120  A remand,
of course, does not guarantee a reversal of the Seventh Circuit’s original
holding.  But, the Court’s move does raise the possibility of broader reaches
for Espinoza—particularly, that nondiscrimination applies not only to the sta-
tus dichotomy of secular and sectarian, but also to entities within a particular
sectarian status (e.g., Catholic schools).  At the same time, this Seventh Cir-
cuit case was another example of discriminatory state action involving relig-
ious schools.  While the Court has never suggested that its nondiscrimination
rule applies only in an educational context, the possibility remains that a
“historic exclusion,” as the Court noted in Locke, may stand in the way of the
rule’s extension to those entities, like churches, with a less attenuated affilia-
tion with religion.121
III. GOVERNMENT AID WHEN DISASTER STRIKES
While none of the aforementioned cases have addressed questions of
religious organizations’ receipt of government aid in the form of disaster
relief, the topic has not gone unaddressed.  In fact, the federal government
has acknowledged that the Establishment Clause is not a barrier to the neu-
tral provision of disaster aid—even when distributed directly to churches.
A. Seattle Hebrew Academy and the Nisqually Earthquake
In February 2001, the Nisqually Earthquake, a magnitude 6.8, occurred
near Seattle, Washington.122  Hundreds of buildings required inspection,
and the City of Seattle estimated building damage losses amounting to nearly
forty million dollars.123  The Seattle Hebrew Academy, a Jewish school, occu-
pied a century-old building that sustained extensive damage in the earth-
quake.124  Accordingly, the Academy applied for disaster assistance through
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).125  The Stafford Disas-
ter Relief and Emergency Assistance Act authorizes the President to make
contributions to a private nonprofit facility “damaged or destroyed by a
major disaster for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or replacement of
118 Id. at 593–94 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 121.51 (2021)).
119 Id. at 594.
120 St. Augustine Sch., 141 S. Ct. at 186.
121 See supra notes 93, 96 and accompanying text.
122 NISQUALLY EARTHQUAKE CLEARINGHOUSE GRP., THE NISQUALLY EARTHQUAKE OF 28
FEBRUARY 2001 PRELIMINARY RECONNAISSANCE REPORT 1 (2001).
123 Id. at 10.
124 History, SEATTLE HEBREW ACAD., https://seattlehebrewacademy.org/about-us/his-
tory/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
125 Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy, 26
Op. O.L.C. 114, 114 (2002).
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the facility and for associated expenses.”126  The President subsequently dele-
gated this authority to FEMA.127
FEMA denied the Academy’s application; it also denied its subsequent
appeal.128  FEMA’s general counsel then sought an opinion from the Office
of Legal Counsel (“OLC”) as to, among other things, whether the Academy’s
selective, faith-based admission process disqualified it from FEMA fund-
ing.129  The OLC concluded that the Establishment Clause did not bar the
distribution of aid to the Academy, since the aid was available “on the basis of
neutral criteria to an unusually broad class of beneficiaries defined without
reference to religion.”130  The program’s design also did not permit signifi-
cant administrative discretion, such that FEMA was precluded from using its
funding powers arbitrarily to favor religion.131  Accordingly, the opinion
qualified the FEMA grants as “general government services,” which broadly
encompassed a wide variety of institutions—religious and secular alike.132
The OLC notably dismissed concerns that funding would be used to advance
its religious purpose.  It analogized to cases where the Court held the govern-
ment cannot deny religious groups equal access to the government’s own
property, which, in this instance, took the form of disaster aid.133
This opinion certainly strayed from the Court’s strict separatism
approach, which was not unsurprising given the Rehnquist neutrality
formula, which governed at the time.  The Court’s prior decision regarding
religious construction grants was not repudiated, and the opinion is not prec-
edential, but it does suggest that the federal understanding of the Establish-
ment Clause had inched in favor of religion.  In the 1971 Tilton decision, the
Court had withheld their veto on the construction grants largely because the
grants could not be used for religious purposes.134  But, Seattle Hebrew
Academy was a Jewish school; religious instruction and worship inevitably
occurred within its classrooms.  Between 1971 and 2002, the Religion Clauses
had not changed, but the makeup of the Court had changed.  The Office of
Legal Counsel noted this explicitly: “[F]our members of the Supreme Court
have made clear that they would sustain any program of aid that provides
126 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121, 5172(a)(1)(B) (2018).  Major disasters are generally limited to
natural catastrophes, fires, floods, and explosions. Id. § 5122(2).
127 See Exec. Order No. 12,148, 3 C.F.R. § 412, 417 (1980); Authority of FEMA to Pro-
vide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy, supra note 125, at 114.
128 See Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy,
supra note 125, at 114.
129 Id. at 115.
130 Id. at 122.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 124.
133 Id. at 129; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 842
(1995) (noting a public university may grant general access to its facilities on a religion-
neutral basis).
134 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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secular assistance, on the basis of neutral criteria.”135  Following the clues
provided in the opinion, numerous federal agencies (including FEMA) sub-
sequently announced changes in policy—they now would finance the “con-
struction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of real property” belonging to
both secular and religious institutions.136
B. Harvest Family Church and Hurricane Harvey
Though FEMA and other agencies broadened the scope of permissible
distribution of disaster aid, one important category—houses of worship—
remained excluded.137  Accordingly, when Hurricane Sandy devastated the
East Coast in 2013, and churches applied for FEMA grants, the simple answer
was “[n]o.”138  Churches, synagogues, and other houses of worship were thus
forced to turn to private donors to cover the hundreds of thousands, and
sometimes millions, of dollars in damage.139  In 2017, the arrival of the
Trump administration, coupled with the emergence of Trinity Lutheran’s use
and status distinction, changed that answer to a “yes.”
At the end of that year, Hurricane Harvey hit the southeastern coast of
Texas, resulting in severe wind and flood damage.140  As Hi-Way Tabernacle
sat in three feet of water, it filed suit against FEMA, arguing that its exclusion-
ary policy was unconstitutional.141  Specifically, Hi-Way, along with its co-
plaintiffs Harvest Family Church and Rockport First Assembly of God, alleged
the status-based policy violated the Free Exercise Clause under Trinity
Lutheran.142  Within a few months, the plaintiffs had moved for a preliminary
injunction and a temporary restraining order, and the district court denied
135 Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy, supra
note 125, at 132.  The Assistant Attorney General cited Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000), where the majority opinion consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist, as well as Justices
Thomas, Scalia, and Kennedy. Id.  The three Associate Justices’ appointments, as well as
Justice Rehnquist’s promotion to Chief Justice, all occurred within a five-year period. See
Justices 1789 to Present, U.S. SUP. CT., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/mem-
bers_text.aspx (last visited Mar. 5, 2021).
136 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Faith-Based Initiative and the Constitution, 55
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 12–13, 13 n.51 (2005).
137 FEMA, POLICY REFERENCE MANUAL: DISASTER ASSISTANCE POLICY § 9521.1(VII)(C)(1)
(2008) (“A facility . . . primarily established or used as a religious institution or place of
worship would be ineligible.”).
138 Sharon Otterman, Houses of Worship Seeking FEMA Grants Face Constitutional Barrier,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2013), nytimes.com/2013/01/04/nyregion/houses-of-worship-seeking-
fema-grants-face-constitutional-barrier.html.
139 Id.
140 Emma Green, Will Trump Direct FEMA to Fund Churches Hit by Hurricanes?, THE
ATLANTIC (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/09/hurri
cane-harvey-faith-based-organizations-fema-trump/539346/.
141 Id.
142 Complaint at 1, 3, Harvest Fam. Church v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency (No. 4:17-
cv-02662) 2017 WL 6060107 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 7,  2017), appeal dismissed, 2018 WL 386192
(5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018).
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them both.143  The court reasoned that, even under the Trinity Lutheran par-
adigm, the plaintiffs could not show a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits to warrant a preliminary injunction.144  Moreover, the court found
Trinity Lutheran inapplicable; because the federal aid would be directed to
Texas churches, and such funding be put to religious uses, Locke was the
proper precedent.145  The government interest in avoiding the use of public
funds for religion reigned supreme.146
The plaintiffs’ attorneys quickly sought appeal in the Fifth Circuit, which
was again denied.147  Focus then turned to the Supreme Court and, more
specifically, Justice Alito, as the assigned Circuit Justice.148  Rather than an
immediate denial, the Justice requested a response from the Solicitor Gen-
eral’s Office, a somewhat uncommon result of an emergency application.149
Instead of issuing a response, FEMA changed its position.  Less than a month
after Justice Alito’s referral, FEMA announced that houses of worship would
be eligible for disaster assistance “without regard to their secular or religious
nature.”150  With both parties in agreement, the Fifth Circuit dismissed the
case as moot and vacated the district court’s previous ruling.151  Congress
subsequently codified FEMA’s new policy; the law now requires that houses
of worship are eligible for FEMA grants without consideration of their relig-
ious character.152
Because neither the Fifth Circuit nor the Supreme Court, through Jus-
tice Alito, ultimately commented on the constitutionality of the change in
grant eligibility, this legal progression’s precedential significance is limited to
that of an anecdotal effect of Trinity Lutheran.  That being said, the voluntary
143 Harvest Fam. Church, 2017 WL 6060107, at *1.
144 See id. at *3; FED. R. CIV. P. 65.
145 Harvest Fam. Church, 2017 WL 6060107, at *3–4.  The Court noted the specific
projects planned by the churches, including “repairs to church sanctuaries, a church stee-
ple, and a fellowship hall.” Id. at *4.
146 Id. at *4.
147 See Order Denying Motion for Injunction Pending Appeal, Harvest Fam. Church v.
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. 17-20768 (5th Cir. Jan. 10, 2018).
148 Emergency Application for Temporary Injunction Pending Appeal at 1, Harvest
Fam. Church v. Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, No. 17-20768 (U.S. Dec. 15, 2017).  Plain-
tiffs had to act quickly because of the dilemmatic structure of FEMA grants, which required
pre-approval before any expenditures could occur. See Eric Rassbach, Religious Liberty and
Disaster Relief for Houses of Worship, 23 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 345, 346–47 (2018) (“I had clients
who had rotting dry wall that they had to figure out whether to yank out or not.”).
149 See Rassbach, supra note 148, at 347.





151 Harvest Fam. Church v. FEMA, No. 17-20768, 2018 WL 386192, at *1 (5th Cir. Jan.
10, 2018) (finding that “in light of FEMA’S recent actions, ‘the government has removed
the reasons for this appeal’”).
152 42 U.S.C. § 5172(a)(3)(C) (2018).
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reversal by FEMA and subsequent codification by Congress does bode well
for the future of other programs that currently exclude religious organiza-
tions.153  This is especially true because, unlike administrative guidelines sub-
ject to future revision, the statutory modifications ensure much greater
permanence to the 2017 disaster relief structure.  But, the structure is limited
to just that—disaster relief—and with an impending change in administra-
tion, further regulatory changes to include religion may be put on hold.
IV. ASSESSING THE PAYCHECK PROTECTION PROGRAM
While the SBA did not openly confront its decision to include religious
organizations in the PPP, outsiders have read between the lines and assumed
that Trinity Lutheran was a likely catalyst.154  In support of this theory, the
SBA had previously cited Establishment Clause concerns when it initially
excluded religious entities.155  But, an agency’s own declaration certainly
cannot make an otherwise unconstitutional program pass constitutional mus-
ter.  Thus, the question remains: Was the SBA correct in extending the PPP
to religious organizations and, in particular, houses of worship?
A. The Religion Clauses
Trinity Lutheran and its progeny—the focus of this Note—is the first and
most fruitful place to look for guidance.  Because the SBA voluntarily opted
to include religious entities, however, the issue of PPP distributions presents
the reverse scenario of those examined in Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza.
Nonetheless, this Note argues that the PPP and, in particular, the distribu-
tion of funding to employers affiliated with the Catholic Church was constitu-
tional under both the nondiscrimination paradigm and the prior neutrality
paradigm.  At the very least, this issue seems to constitute an instance of the
“play in the joints” recognized in Locke—an instance permitted by the Estab-
lishment Clause, but not necessarily required by the Free Exercise Clause.156
The first step is evaluating the likely result if the SBA had, as the critics
preferred, maintained its official policy and excluded religious organizations
from receiving PPP loans.  Importantly, the SBA never altered its official pol-
icy surrounding loans; it merely adopted a policy of non-enforcement for the
PPP context.157  Assuming Trinity Lutheran’s status and use distinction
153 It is important, however, not to overstate the voluntariness of FEMA’s policy shift.
As a federal agency under President Trump’s authority, he had the power to direct FEMA
to expand religious organizations’ eligibility, and he tweeted his support for such expan-
sion. See Green, supra note 140; @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER (Sept. 8, 2017, 8:56 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/906320446882271232.
154 See BRANNON, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that SBA’s acknowledgement that its own
regulations excluded a class of participants based on religious status likely implies that “the
SBA ha[d] similar Trinity Lutheran-based concerns”); see also supra note 37 and accompany-
ing text.
155 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
156 See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
157 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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remains good law, the SBA’s general exclusionary policy falls squarely within
the category of status discrimination in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
As it stands, all entities principally engaged in religious activities are ineligi-
ble to receive SBA loans, regardless of how the funds would be used.158  Even
if the SBA was concerned that government funding could be used for relig-
ious ends, Espinoza made clear that such motivations are irrelevant; the
inquiry ends at the policy itself.159  Moreover, the Court’s decision to vacate
the Seventh Circuit decision in Evers suggests the SBA also would be pre-
cluded from allowing only certain religious entities—for example, those
churches in greatest financial need—from receiving PPP loans.160
Of course, as noted at the end of Part II, the Court has not addressed,
post-Trinity Lutheran, the receipt of government funds by houses of worship.
While Trinity Lutheran Church is, of course, a church, the Court there con-
sidered the dispersal of funds to its preschool and daycare center; Espinoza
similarly involved a school tuition program.161  However, Trinity Lutheran and
Espinoza imply that this is merely a distinction without a difference.  The
Court distinguished Locke from both cases on the basis of use alone.162
Though Justice Gorsuch subsequently made reference to the historic exclu-
sion of funding clergy at issue in Locke, this was not a factor the Court consid-
ered in either of its two most recent cases.163  Additionally, the progression
of FEMA’s policy after Hurricane Harvey toward one including houses of
worship signals a general understanding, at least within the executive branch,
that the Trinity Lutheran nondiscrimination approach has greater reaches
than merely the educational context.164
The analysis could end here, with a finding that the SBA’s decision not
to enforce its official policy when administering the PPP was proper, even if
only to avoid constitutional clashes with the Court’s understanding, in Trinity
Lutheran and Espinoza, of the Free Exercise Clause.  But, a court could also
reason that the SBA’s decision to deviate from its longstanding policy must
be considered independently, with the “new” policy reviewed on its own
merit.  If so, the Establishment Clause would govern.  Notably, by the time
Trinity Lutheran arrived at the Supreme Court, the State had conceded that
the Establishment Clause did not bar the dispersal of funds for playground
resurfacing.165 Zelman v. Simmons Harris also indicates a similar finding of
constitutionality.  There, the Court emphasized the program’s neutrality as
well as the fact that the government was not directly funding religious schools;
parents acted as an intermediary, dictating which schools would receive
158 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text.
160 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
161 See supra Section II.B.
162 See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
163 See supra Section II.B.
164 See supra Section III.B.
165 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 (2017).
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funds.166  The PPP program operates similarly.  First, all small businesses are
eligible for PPP loans in a neutral fashion—religious institutions receive no
preferences or favors.167  Secondly, since the loans are issued by private lend-
ers, the SBA does not actually distribute any government funds.168  Thus,
even under a neutrality paradigm, the distribution of PPP funds to the Catho-
lic Church faces no constitutional barriers.
A final question, and likely the most uncertain, involves use.  Nothing
from Trinity Lutheran or Espinoza precludes the SBA from prohibiting the use
of PPP funds for religious purposes.  If it did so, multiple scenarios are plausi-
ble.  On the one hand, the Court seemed ready in Espinoza to embrace Jus-
tice Gorsuch’s position that use discrimination should be subject to the same
level of scrutiny as status discrimination.  On the other hand, even he recog-
nized that Locke’s holding, which upheld the denial of a scholarship for a
theology degree, stemmed from a historic proscription of government fund-
ing of church clergy.169  Undoubtedly, the distribution of PPP loans to the
Catholic Church has involved funding the salaries of clergy and other minis-
terial staff.  The SBA and, subsequently, Congress mandated that a minimum
of sixty percent of received funds be used for payroll costs, and ministerial
employees comprise just over half of parish staff.170  The Court’s jurispru-
dence appears too unsettled, post-Trinity Lutheran and Espinoza, to answer
how the Court would respond to a policy of use discrimination, but the
Court’s gradual trend toward greater generosity for religious institutions
bodes well for potential litigants.  For now, this question need not be
answered; the SBA’s official policy, even if not guiding the issuance of PPP
loans, remains one involving status discrimination, wholly impermissible
under Espinoza.171
B. The Equal Protection Clause
An alternative theory rests on the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.172  Though initially enacted in response to racial dis-
crimination, the Clause’s terms are sufficiently broad to include religious
discrimination as well.173  Professor Eugene Volokh has suggested, in the
context of school tuition programs, that the Constitution “requires—and cer-
166 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
167 See supra notes 30–34 and accompanying text.
168 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
170 See supra notes 32, 43 and accompanying text.
171 See supra notes 111–13 and accompanying text.
172 For a detailed discussion of this topic, see generally Michael J. Borger, Note, The
Wholesale Exclusion of Religion from Public Benefits Programs: Why the First Amendment Religion
Clauses Must Take a Backseat to Equal Protection, 33 TOURO L. REV. 633 (2017).
173 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
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tainly allows—equal treatment of religion, not discrimination against it.”174
Examination of this theory, while a departure from the Court’s precedent
regarding the Religion Clauses, is appropriate given the Court’s embrace of a
discrimination standard in Trinity Lutheran.  Such a standard, in fact, seems
to align more closely with themes of equal treatment than the establishment
or exercise of religion.  Moreover, while not gaining enough support to gar-
ner a majority, members of the Court have recommended the Equal Protec-
tion Clause as a better approach even before Trinity Lutheran, like Justice
White did in McDaniel v. Paty, particularly when religious interference was
minimal or unclear.175
While certainly not the focus of this Note, the Court’s Equal Protection
jurisprudence makes clear that a state’s interest in discriminatory legislation
is subject to some level of court review, ranging from mere rational basis to
strict scrutiny.176  Notably, strict scrutiny parallels Chief Justice Roberts’s
application in Trinity Lutheran of “exacting scrutiny” when states discriminate
against religion.177  The Court has also applied this standard to the Free
Exercise challenge in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah,
which involved local ordinances that targeted the Santeria religion.178
There, the Court noted that laws that discriminate against religion “will sur-
vive strict scrutiny only in rare cases.”179
Given this precedent, a doctrinal embrace of an Equal Protection analy-
sis, either exclusively or in addition to a First Amendment analysis, may be a
feasible way to promote predictability within the murky Religion Clauses
framework.  If so, Justice White’s concurrence in McDaniel proposes a possi-
ble analysis.180  First, the government imposing a religious exclusion would
have to demonstrate an interest driving the exclusion; this is almost certain to
be a desire to maintain the separation between church and state.181 Trinity
Lutheran and Espinoza further require that the state interest is “of the highest
order,” as constrained by the Free Exercise Clause.182  The court would then
174 Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL’Y 341, 347 (1999).
175 See 435 U.S. 618, 643–44 (1978) (White, J., concurring) (arguing that a Tennessee
statute that excluded clergy from the state legislature did not deny petitioner’s ability to
exercise his religion, but it did deny him equal protection of the laws).
176 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 451 (1985) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (“[O]ur cases reflect a continuum of judgmental responses to differing
classifications . . . .”).  The varying levels of scrutiny present intricacies and ongoing
debates that, for purposes of this Note, are only minimally discussed.
177 See supra note 89 and accompanying text; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511
U.S. 127, 161 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (suggesting that religious belief would be sub-
ject to heightened scrutiny).
178 508 U.S. 520, 545–46 (1993).
179 Id.
180 See McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 643–46; Borger, supra note 172, at 667–68.
181 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645.
182 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024 (2017)
(quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628); Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246,
2260 (2020) (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628).
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apply strict scrutiny, examining both whether the exclusion actually serves the
government’s alleged interest and whether the exclusion is either overinclu-
sive or underinclusive.183  This paradigm would comport with Espinoza’s pass-
ing suggestion that both status and use discrimination deserve heightened
scrutiny.184
If applied to the PPP, an Equal Protection analysis leads to the conclu-
sion that the SBA was correct in adopting an inclusionary policy and allowing
the distribution of funds to houses of worship.  Otherwise, if the SBA opted
to apply its official policy, it would predictably argue—as in the past—that
the policy serves an interest in separating church and state.185  But, such a
policy is unlikely to withstand strict scrutiny.  Not only does the SBA’s official
policy violate the Free Exercise Clause, as discussed above in Section IV.A,
but it also is undoubtedly overinclusive.  At a minimum, recipients of PPP
loans must use sixty percent of funds for payroll costs, and almost half of
Catholic Church employees occupy nonministerial (nonreligious) posi-
tions.186  A broad exclusionary policy, thus, would have precluded the use of
government funds to cover the salaries of janitors, bookkeepers, secretaries,
and the like—all of whom serve secular functions.
Meanwhile, such a policy would also be underinclusive; the prior policy
excluded only those entities principally engaged in religious activities.187  A
for-profit business, hypothetically, that designs secular clothing with the occa-
sional feature of a Bible verse or religious depiction would, in all likelihood,
remain eligible.  Accordingly, while Justice White’s paradigm cannot estab-
lish, for certain, the constitutionality of the SBA’s PPP policy, it does demon-
strate that the alternative would likely violate the Equal Protection Clause.188
183 McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 645. For example, Justice White observed the following fac-
tors that weighed against the State: while all states have an interest in maintaining a separa-
tion between church and state, only Tennessee imposed a clergy restriction; the
disqualification applied only to legislative positions; and it applied even to those ministers
whose church duties would not interfere with government service. Id.
184 See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
185 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
186 See supra note 32, 43 and accompanying text.
187 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
188 For an interesting, though certainly unconventional, third approach to the constitu-
tionality of the PPP, a few business owners have argued that the stay-at-home and maxi-
mum capacity orders constitute takings under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
with the PPP and other grants defended as their requisite compensation.  Courts and legal
scholars, however, have generally dismissed these arguments as implausible at best. See,
e.g., Friends of Danny DeVito v. Wolf, 227 A.3d 872, 879, 893, 895–96 (Pa. 2020), cert.
denied, 140 S. Ct. 2758 (mem.) (U.S. May 6, 2020) (No. 19A1032) (finding the exercise of
State police powers generally does not raise Takings concerns); SEAN M. STIFF, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., LSB10434, COVID-19 RESPONSE: CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS FOR PRIVATE PROP-
ERTY 4–5 (2020); Grover Norquist Explains Why His Foundation Took PPP Money From Govern-
ment, CNBC (July 13, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/video/2020/07/13/grover-norquist-
explains-why-his-foundation-took-ppp-money-from-government.html (featuring an inter-
view with Grover Norquist, where he uses the Takings Clause as justification for applying
for PPP loans); Stephen E. Shay, Turning to the Government (for PPP Money) in Time of Need,
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CONCLUSION
Despite the heated response to the Catholic Church’s receipt of govern-
ment funding, the SBA adopted the constitutionally correct standard when it
deemed the Catholic Church, as well as other houses of worship, eligible for
PPP loans.  Although American culture and media continue to cling to the
traditional notion of the “wall of separation between church and state,” the
Court has long abandoned such a paradigm.  Most recently, in Trinity
Lutheran and again in Espinoza, the Court has embraced a principle of non-
discrimination, which prohibits the government from excluding religious
entities based on status alone.189  Moreover, the legal “writing on the wall”
suggests this new principle is part of a larger trend, with several members of
the Court willing to continue to expand this doctrine in favor of religion.
Because the SBA’s official policy, which remains in force, relies on a prohib-
ited status-based discrimination, the SBA should, as FEMA did in 2017, offi-
cially adopt its inclusive PPP policy.190  And, other federal agencies should
do the same.  Such policies not only better align with the Court’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, but it also ensures religious enti-
ties—as well as those who they employ—are not disadvantaged when the next
disaster inevitably strikes.  The Free Exercise Clause requires nothing less,
and the Establishment Clause requires nothing more.
168 TAX NOTES FED. 841, 845–46 (2020) (offering a specific response to Grover Norquist’s
compensation claims).
189 See supra Section II.B.
190 See supra Section III.B.  In mid-December 2020, the SBA initiated the process for
such an amendment with a proposed rule that eliminates the broad exclusion of houses of
worship from SBA loan consideration.  Regulatory Reform Initiative: Streamlining and
Modernizing the 7(a), Microloan, and 504 Loan Programs to Reduce Unnecessary Regula-
tory Burden, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,676, 80,677–78 (proposed Dec. 14, 2020) (to be codified at
13 C.F.R. pts. 120, 123).  The SBA explicitly noted that its prior 1996 regulation was “not
consistent with current Supreme Court jurisprudence in that it focuses on the nature of
the business . . . instead of on how the loan proceeds . . . will be used.” Id. at 80,677–78.
The SBA has now shifted its focus to assuring that the use of loan proceeds comports with
the Establishment Clause, but it has not specified the manner by which it intends to do so.
Id. at 80,678.
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